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TAXING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:
UNDERSTANDING A BASIC INSTITUTION OF STATE CAPITALISM*
Wei Cui
Abstract
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) from emerging economies and resource-rich countries
have been increasingly active investors in global markets in the last decade, challenging
policymakers in Canada and other OECD countries to confront the logic of “state
capitalism”. This article develops a novel theory of the income taxation of SOEs and
explores its implications for international tax policy. Many countries subject their SOEs
to income taxes, but traditional public finance theorists tend to dismiss SOE taxation as
superfluous. A popular, contrary belief holds that SOE taxation is necessary to ensure fair
competition. This Article shows that both views are mistaken, and suggests an
explanation of SOE taxation in terms of the divergent interests between SOE managers
and shareholders and the problem these create for dividend policy. The usual solutions
for mitigating the agency problem in dividend policy for private firms may not be
available for SOEs, and taxing SOEs becomes an alternative mechanism for forcing
distributions. The “forced distribution” view of SOE taxation importantly implies that
SOEs may be highly tax sensitive. I discuss the factors affecting SOE tax sensitivity
using a simple analytic model, and demonstrate its consequences for international tax
policies in both countries with strong SOE presence and those facing SOE investments.
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An earlier, substantially different version of this article appeared as a part of the Governance and
Globalization Working Paper Series published by SciencesPo in 2011. The earlier working paper discusses
certain empirical evidence of SOE response to income taxation. A much fuller review of such evidence is
now offered in a companion piece to this article. This article also discusses earlier literature supporting the
forced distribution theory of SOE taxation, as well as the theory’s implications for international taxation.

Introduction
In Canada, the United States, Europe, and OECD countries elsewhere, recent
social scientific and legal scholarship has largely ignored issues of institutional design
arising from the state ownership of enterprises. Even though the global financial crisis of
2008 and the Euro-zone crisis of 2011 have led to the partial (re-)nationalization of
failing financial institutions in a number of economies, public discussions of these policy
measures tend to assume that they are temporary in nature, and do not reverse the general
trend towards privatization and liberalization that had started in the 1980s.1 However,
advanced market economies have recently had to deal more frequently with state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) of other countries. This is because, despite decades of privatization,
substantial state ownership persists in developing, transitional, and developed
economies,2 and some SOEs are now important global economic players, competing with
private multinationals and investors in making global investments.3 This has triggered
extensive discussions in the international community,4 as well as domestic policy debates
in Canada and other OECD countries.5 The significance of SOEs from countries that
purportedly practice “state capitalism” has even inspired a best-selling book, “The End of
the Free Market”.6 As the provocative title of the book suggests, understanding how
SOEs work has become a timely subject even for countries that practice “private
capitalism”, so that they can better cope with the consequences of other countries’
choices of institutional design.
1

See e.g. David E Sanger, “Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look”, The New York Times (25 January
2009); Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?
(New York: Portfolio, 2010) ch 5, 6.
2
See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), State-Owned Enterprises in the
Development Process (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015); OECD, The Size and Sectoral Distribution of SOEs
in OECD and Partner Countries (Paris: OECD publishing, 2014); Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G Lazzarini,
Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 2014); and World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of
Government Ownership (Washington: Oxford University Press, 1995).
3
Bremmer, supra note 1, ch 3, 4.
4
See e.g. International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles”, (2008) online: <http://www.iwgswf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm>; P. Kowalski, M. Büge, M. Sztajerowska and M. Egeland, “State-Owned
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications” (2013) OECD Trade Policy Paper, No. 147; H.
Christiansen and Y. Kim, “State-Invested Enterprises in the Global Marketplace: Implications for A Level
Playing Field” (2014) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 14. For the activities of the
OECD’s Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices, see
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/soeworkingparty.htm (see, in particular, the current discussion surrounding the
2014-15 Revision of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises).
5
See e.g. Daniel Schwanen, “Speed Dating or Serious Courtship? Canada and Foreign State-Owned
Enterprises”, online: (2012) C.D. Howe Institute E-Brief 142 <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/ebrief_142.pdf>; Duanjie Chen, China's State-Owned Enterprises: How Much Do We Know? From CNOOC
to Its Siblings (Calgary: University of Calgary School of Public Policy, 2013); Michael Podolny, “The
Limits of Sovereign Immunity: A Study and Analysis of the Canadian Income Taxation of Sovereign
Wealth Funds” (2012) 70:2 UT Fac L Rev 90.
6
Bremmer, supra note 1. Bremmer defines “state capitalism” as a system of state dominance that allows
“governments to minimize the political risks they face by maximizing their control over activities that
generate substantial amounts of wealth”. Id, at 157

1

But even in countries that have many SOEs, how they operate is far from being
well understood. One prominent example is a long-standing failure for a consensus on the
nature of the income taxation of SOEs to emerge.7 Taxing SOEs has remained a
widespread, even if not universal, practice in the last two decades,8 consistent with the
findings of earlier surveys of the subject.9 Countries lying across the spectrum of high to
low percentages of public ownership in their respective economies have subjected their
SOEs to the income tax: the Nordic countries, Germany, France, Austria, New Zealand,
India, South Korea, Singapore and China, to name just a few.10 Especially in countries
where SOEs are important to the economy, income tax collected from SOEs often also
constitutes a vital source of government revenue.11 In recognition of this empirical
pattern, scholars have investigated the empirical determinants of the effective tax burden
of SOEs,12 SOEs’ responses to taxation,13 and the effect of SOE taxation on enterprise
productivity.14 Yet the fundamental questions of why SOEs are taxed on their income,
and how, conceptually, the tax can be expected to affect SOE behavior, have never been
adequately answered.
In particular, two mutually inconsistent perspectives on SOE taxation have long
co-existed in public and academic discourses. The first perspective is found mainly in the
theoretical economic literature. According to this perspective, public ownership of assets
7

SOEs may be subject to a variety of other taxes, e.g. consumption-type taxes such as the VAT, selective
commodity taxes, and environmental taxes. The framework developed in this article has implications for
analyzing SOEs’ response to these other taxes as well, but they are beyond the scope of this article.
8
See OECD, Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private
Business (OECD Publishing, 2012), Chapter 5 (“In practice, a majority of SOEs operating in OECD
economies are subject to the same or similar tax treatment as private enterprises.”)
9
Robert H Floyd, “Some Aspects of Income Taxation of Public Enterprises” (1978) 25:2 IMF Staff Papers
310 at 317 (finding that “perhaps the most common, but far from universal, practice is simply to make no
distinction between public and private ownership” in the imposition of the income tax on enterprises);
Glenn P Jenkins, Taxation of State-Owned Enterprises: Discussion Paper No. 225, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1986) (citing and confirming Floyd’s
survey).
10
This list is compiled by examining recent publicly available financial statements of select SOEs from
these countries. The list of select SOEs is taken from Table 8 of Louis Kuijs, William Mako & Chunlin
Zhang, SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom? (World Bank Policy Notes, 2005) at 18. The actual list
of countries that tax their own SOEs is much longer.
11
See, for example, Vietnam News, “State-owned enterprises pay most corporate taxes,” December 3, 2014
online: <http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/263547/state-owned-enterprises-pay-most-corporate-taxes.html>
(SOEs accounted for 65.5% of total corporate income tax payments in the country); Wei Cui, “Taxation of
State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China,” in Benjamin Liebman & Curtis
Milhaupt, eds, Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) (SOEs contributed well over 10 percent of total enterprise
income tax collected in China in recent years).
12
See e.g. Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, & Hao Zhang, “Public Policy, Political Connections, and
Effective Tax Rates: Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia” (2006) 25:5 J Accounting & Public Policy 574;
Cui, supra note 11.
13
See, e.g. Clemens Fuest and Li Liu, “Does Ownership Affect the Impact of Taxes on Firm Behavior?
Evidence from China” (2015) CESifo Working Paper No. 5316; Terry Shevlin, Tanya Tang, and Ryan
Wilson, “Domestic Income Shifting by Chinese Listed Firms” (2012) 34 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1.
14
John Whalley & Li Wang, “The Unified Enterprise Tax and SOEs in China,” in John Whalley, ed,
China's Integration Into the World Economy (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013) at 179.
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provides a source of public revenue separate from taxation and government debt. As
argued by the Nobel laureate James Meade15 and more recently by others,16 there is no
need to tax income from publicly owned assets because that income already belongs to
the government. Therefore, the taxation of SOEs is an arrangement that one should “see
through” as being fundamentally different from taxing private enterprises. In particular,
“seeing through” SOE taxation means that many of the behavioral distortions associated
with income taxation of private investments should not arise in connection with taxing
SOEs. In fact, one beneficial effect of public ownership is thought to be that it reduces
the need to raise revenue through taxes, thereby reducing tax-induced distortions in an
economy.17 And insofar as SOE taxation lacks behavioral consequences that characterize
“normal” taxation, it can be said to be a superfluous institution.
While coherent, this “superfluity view” of SOE taxation is contradicted by both
the prevalence of and the importance generally attached to SOE taxation in real-world
practice. Such real-world practice has given credence to a second traditional perspective,
which flatly contradicts the first. It holds that SOE taxation, far from being superfluous,
is necessary for putting SOEs on an equal footing with private firms. This second view of
SOE taxation, which one may label as the “condition of neutrality” view, has
considerable influence in Europe, where the taxation of enterprises regardless of
ownership is constitutionally codified in some countries.18 Moreover, the powerful “state
aid” doctrine19 laid out in the Treaties of the European Communities has been interpreted
to preclude governments from offering tax subsidies to publicly-owned enterprises.20
The “condition of neutrality” view also has currency in many developing countries,
where income taxation of SOEs is incontrovertibly important. It possesses an easy
rhetorical appeal, and in terms of winning followers, dominates the “superfluity view”.
However, it is vulnerable to fairly straightforward repudiation by public finance theory.21
In short, SOE taxation is a topic in respect of which facts and theory do not meet:
those who are familiar with theory make claims and predictions contradicted by actual
facts, while those who are acquainted with the facts offer erroneous theory. This article
aims to close this gap, by offering a new theoretical framework for analyzing the income
taxation of SOEs.
The theory developed here starts with the fact that for SOEs and private firms
alike, there are divergent interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore
dividend or payout policy that is optimal from the shareholders’ perspective is by no
15

James E Meade, Liberty, Equality, and Efficiency (New York; NYU Press, 1993).
For further discussion and general references, see infra notes 28-9, 32.
17
For further discussion, see infra notes 28-32.
18
See e.g. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), a 3, 104(a)-115; Rainer Hüttemann,
Die Besteuerung Der Öffentlichen Hand (Otto Schmidt, 2002) at 8-18.
19
See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 25 March 1957, OJ C 326 at 107 (entered into
force 1 January 1958).
20
See Wolfgang Schӧn, “Taxation and State Aid Law in the European Union” (1999) 36:5 CML Rev 911;
A. Capobianco and H. Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and
Policy Options” (2011) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1.
21
See discussion in Section II, below.
16
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means assured. This is the “agency problem” with respect to dividend payouts.22 For
private firms, typical solutions to this problem include monitoring by substantial
shareholders and giving managers partial ownership. These solutions, however,
historically have not been, and to some extent institutionally cannot be, adequately
implemented for SOEs. Consequently, the taxation of SOEs can be a mechanism for
forcing distributions. The idea that SOE taxation in fact plays this role may be called the
“forced distribution” view. Under this view, SOE taxation may have partially
compensated for weak corporate governance of SOEs in many countries.
The “forced distribution” theory seizes on a basic conceptual weakness in the
superfluity view. That latter view relies on an inference from the equivalence of tax and
dividends to the equivalence of tax and retained earnings. The latter equivalence is
needed for the conclusion that SOE taxation has no behavioral consequences (and
therefore is ultimately superfluous). Yet if securing dividend payouts from SOE earnings
is a significant institutional issue, that equivalence does not hold, and SOE taxation can
have significant consequences just like the taxation of private firms.
This, however, raises a further question: how sensitive are SOEs to income
taxation? Contrary to prevalent assumptions, I will argue that this is an empirical question
and cannot be known a priori. On the one hand, managers should be presumed to be
averse to taxes, as they are to all distributions, and the government can be presumed to
prefer them. On the other hand, this configuration of preferences could lead to bargaining
between SOE managers and the government, which could result in managers being given
“credit” for taxes paid, in addition to “credit” for making the SOEs profitable. In some
outcomes of this bargaining process, SOE managers may indeed display insensitivity to
taxes, but this need not be the case. Available empirical evidence is in fact mixed: while a
robust group of studies finds that SOEs are tax-sensitive and engage in the whole range
of tax planning and tax avoidance, the issue is far from settled.23 The forced distribution
theory of SOE taxation developed here provides a framework for further empirical
investigation.
Although some of the prior literature SOE taxation hinted at the “forced
distribution” theory,24 it is far less well-known than the two traditional views sketched
above. This article substantially elaborates and advances the “forced distribution” view in
three ways. First, it makes several novel arguments against the two traditional views,
highlighting their respective weaknesses as well as mutual inconsistency, which so far
have been insufficiently noted. For example, I demonstrate the inadequacies of certain ad
hoc explanations of SOE taxation offered by those who subscribe to the superfluity view.

22

The literature on payout policy for private firms is large. For overviews, see Rafael LaPorta et al,
“Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World” (2000) 55 J Finance 1; Franklin Allen &
Roni Michaely, Payout Policy (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Wharton Financial Institutions
Center, 2002).
23
See Section III for further discussion.
24
Notably, some Canadian public economists have advocated what can be best read as the forced
distribution view. See Jenkins, supra note 9; Whalley, supra note 14. This work is discussed further in
Section III, below.
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Against the “condition of neutrality” view, I argue that it implies an untenable position
with respect to the incidence of the corporate tax.
Second, the article grounds the “forced distribution” view explicitly in the recent
scholarship on corporate governance. I offer an analysis of SOE tax sensitivity by
borrowing from a formal model of the agency problem in dividend policy by Raj Chetty
and Emanuel Saez.25 The analysis captures the ideas both of SOE managers appropriating
funds for projects which do not benefit shareholders (in similar fashion to private firm
managers) and of the government negotiating with SOE managers to induce tax payment
(which it does not do with private firms). I also examine another model for the interaction
between taxation and corporate governance by Desai, Dyck and Zingales,26 and explain
why the model in this article is more suitable for understanding SOE taxation.
Third and finally, the article demonstrates the policy significance of the forced
distribution theory by applying it to the area of international taxation, showing how the
theory enables us to better understand both the international behavior of SOEs and likely
effect of traditional tax policies on such behavior. In particular, I argue that because the
degree of SOE tax sensitivity is contingent on the bargaining between SOE managers and
the government owner, it is likely that SOEs are at a comparative tax disadvantage
relative to private firms when investing overseas. This opens the intriguing possibility
that host countries like Canada may offer tax incentives specifically targeted at SOEs
without thereby disadvantaging private investors. Some countries (such as the United
States and Australia) already offer such incentives, and the theory of SOE tax sensitivity
given here suggests a defense of such practices against the blind application of the
neutrality benchmark.
The article proceeds as follows. Sections I and II demonstrate how the two
traditional perspectives on SOE taxation have failed to rationalize the practice. Section I
shows that explanations of SOE taxation in terms of mixed public-and-private ownership
and the presence of multiple tiers of government are ad hoc, and cannot play a primary
explanatory role. Section II argues that, because public and private financings of SOEs
are generally not substitutable, and because the public supply of capital is likely inelastic,
the non-taxation of SOE profits need not distort competition, contrary to the “condition of
neutrality” view. Section III then outlines a solution to the puzzle of SOE taxation, in
terms of the difficulty in conceiving and implementing dividend policy for SOEs. I
explain why mechanisms for ensuring optimal payout for private firms may not work for
SOEs, and contrast public pension funds with the types of SOEs that are the focus of this
article..
Section IV explores one of the implications of the forced distribution theory,
namely SOE managers may be tax-averse. It sets out a conceptual analysis and briefly
summarizes empirical evidence. Section V then discusses the theory’s implications for
25

Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation: NBER Working Paper 13538
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007).
26
Mihir Desai, Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, “Theft and Taxes” (2007) 84:3 J Financial Economics
591.
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international tax policy, both in countries with substantial SOE presence, and in countries
facing SOE investments. The Conclusion discusses the implications of the article’s
analysis for broader areas of tax and non-tax policies, as well as directions for further
research.
I. Is SOE Taxation Superfluous?
For anyone thinking about the issue for the first time, income taxation of SOEs
should appear puzzling. The corporate income tax is collected from corporate profits, but
if an SOE is wholly government-owned, its profit in theory already belongs to the state,
and the state could access such profit simply by requiring dividend distributions. A tax on
corporate profits merely reduces the amount of profits otherwise distributable. At the
least, this imposes administrative costs: corporate income tax rules tend to be complex;
having the SOE compute its taxable income according to such rules, and having tax
agencies audit such computations, seems a wasteful exercise. In countries with many
and/or large SOEs, the scale of this administrative ritual can be spectacular in terms of
revenue collected and personnel spent. What is it like for the lawmakers in these
countries to design the corporate income tax, if they know that a major portion of the “tax”
revenue could be more efficiently collected some other way?
A standard response from public finance theorists to the above puzzle seems to be
simply to ignore it. Under one strong version of their view, since SOE profits belong to
the state, there is really no point for the state to tax such profits. Both the government and
SOE managers are necessarily indifferent between taxes paid by SOEs, on one hand, and
profits retained by them, on the other. The SOE taxation we observe in the real world has
no real significance, and must just be the result of administrative and legal formalities.27
To appreciate how strongly many public economists may be tied to this view, it
may be noted that some of them have used the premise that SOE taxation does not matter
to explain the very fact of the public ownership of production. That is, the very existence
of SOEs is explained (in part) by their insensitivity to taxation. Roger Gordon,28 Harry
Huizinga and Soren Bo Nielsen29 have attempted to explain state ownership of productive
assets as a second-best efficient arrangement: SOEs themselves may be inefficient for
various reasons, but when a country adopts tax rates so high as would seriously distort
investment decisions, private ownership can be even more inefficient. What is special
about SOEs, in this theory, is that the efficiency of their operations “should not directly
depend on the tax structure.”30 This is because either SOEs are not subject to the income
tax, or, even if they are, it does not matter31 The influence of this view on policymakers
27

They are, therefore, also not worth theorizing about.
Roger Gordon, “Taxes and Privatization” in Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-Werner Sinn, eds, Public Finance
and Public Policy in the New Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003) 185.
29
See Harry Huizinga & Soren Bo Nielsen, “Privatization, Public Investment, and Capital Income Taxation”
(2001) 82:1 J Public Economics 399.
30
Gordon, supra note 28.
31
Ibid. (“[Taxes] and dividends are functionally equivalent for a state-owned firm, so that all that matters is
the sum, not the composition, of these payments, and dividends can adjust to offset any changes in tax
rates.”)
28

6

can be detected in places like the OECD’s report on “Corporate Governance of StateOwned Enterprises”.32
However, in light of the prevalence of SOE taxation around the world, the
position that SOE taxation is superfluous seems dogmatic. SOE taxation looks anything
but accidental. As a result, weaker versions of the view that SOE taxation does not
ultimately matter may be offered. According to some such weaker versions,33 two
circumstances may explain SOE taxation: first, SOEs may have mixed public and private
ownership; and second, the government that owns an SOE may not be the government
that taxes it (even if these are government entities within the same country). It is these
special circumstances that explain the prevalence of SOE taxation. Where such
circumstances are absent, taxing SOEs is superfluous.
While these explanations of SOE taxation possess intuitive appeals, the following
subsections argue that they cannot bear the theoretical weight that they are expected to.
1. Mixed Public-Private Ownership
Let us examine the mixed-ownership explanation first. The idea is that if a
partially state-owned SOE is not subject to the income tax, then private investment in the
firm would enjoy a tax advantage relative to private investments in purely private firms,
because the latter investments bear some of the burden of the corporate income tax. From
the perspective of competitive neutrality, therefore, SOE taxation may be justified for
mixed-owner firms.
The first objection to this explanation is that although mixed ownership may
require an SOE to be taxed, the SOE need not be taxed in the same way as purely private
firms. It should be possible to exempt the government’s portion of a firm’s profits from
the income tax, while at the same time maintaining the tax on private investors’ share of
firm profits. If one does this, there will still be a difference between the before- and aftertax profits for the portion of the firm’s earnings that belong to private investors, and such
investors would not enjoy any tax advantage on investment in mixed-owner firms relative
to other investments. Nonetheless, there would be no difference between the before- and
after-tax profits belonging to the government shareholder.
To illustrate, suppose that a firm is owned 50% by the state and 50% by private
investors. Suppose that the state investor demands a 6% annual return from the firm,
while the private investors demand a 9% return (the reason why the state’s required rate
32

OECD, Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) at 21
(“[State] ownership might be desirable where the state cannot credibly promise not to confiscate or
excessively tax enterprises. Where the state cannot guarantee such conditions, state ownership is needed,
albeit as a second best solution, otherwise investment would not take place.”)
33
Some authors who view SOE taxation as possibly a pragmatically superior form of profit distribution
than negotiated dividends, without recognizing the systematic significance of the payout problem for SOEs
or the issue of SOE tax sensitivity, may also be counted as holding a weaker version of the orthodox view.
See Section III, infra, especially notes 68-9 and accompanying text.
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of return might be lower than that of the private investor is discussed in Section II infra34).
If the firm is subject to a 25% corporate tax on all of its income, it must receive a 10%
before-tax return to meet investors’ expectations.35 There is thus a “tax wedge” of 2.5%,
preventing some productive investments (i.e. those yielding returns between 7.5% and
10%) from being made. Suppose, instead, that the government’s portion of investment
return is exempt from tax. Then investments generating pre-tax returns greater than 9%
would be sufficient to meet investor expectations. The tax wedge (1.5%) is smaller.36
This is clearly more desirable in efficiency terms, and the accounting that would
accomplish may not be too difficult. In fact, it is reported that Brazilian tax law at least at
one time contained mechanisms for exempting the public portion of the profits of mixedownership firms from taxation.37 One complication is that if profits attributable to
different owners are taxed at different rates, then distributions to the different
shareholders must be specially arranged to avoid the shifting of tax benefits and burdens
among shareholders.38 However, it appears that some countries have embraced such
complication.39 The question can thus be raised as to why such mechanisms for
differentially taxing private and public capital in mixed-ownership firms are not more
commonly observed.
Furthermore, if one believes that a pure SOE would be indifferent to taxation
because both the SOE manager and the government shareholder are indifferent between
$1 of tax paid and $1 of retained earnings, then she must believe, with respect to the
above example of a mixed-ownership firm, that the firm should already be using the 9%
benchmark rate for making investment decisions. Whether the government’s portion of
corporate income is formally exempt or not should make no difference. This hypothesis
may be empirically testable, by examining whether, holding everything else equal, firms
with greater state ownership use lower rates of discount in investment decisions as a
result of the government shareholder’s indifference between the before- and after-tax
rates of return. If such phenomenon exists, it is not known.
This last point underscores an important methodological issue. In theorizing about
SOE taxation, how a purely state-owned firm would respond to taxation is the primary
34

The numerical example in the rest of the paragraph would lead to the same conclusion—that not taxing
the state portion of the firm’s capital would lead to a smaller tax wedge—even if the return on the state’s
portion of the capital is assumed to be the same as, or higher than, the private investors’ required rates of
return.
35
A 10% pre-tax return equals a 7.5% after-tax return, which is just enough to satisfy the demand of 6%
return for the state-invested half of the capital and 9% for the other, privately-invested half.
36
9% is the sum of 6% tax-free return for 50% of the capital that is state-owned and 12% pre-tax (9% aftertax) return for the remainder that is privately owned. The after-tax rate of return for the firm is still 7.5%,
hence a 1.5% tax wedge.
37
Floyd, supra note 9 at 315 (the proportion of profits attributable to the share participations of federal,
state, and municipal governments in any enterprise is excluded from the determination of profits for tax
purposes).
38
Ibid at 328.
39
Besides the example of Brazil, another mechanism for taxing profits attributable to different owners at
different rates is reported by Floyd, supra note 9 at 316: Iran imposed higher tax rates on state-owned
companies, and “for companies with mixed government and private ownership, the profits are apportioned
in the same manner as the ownership and are taxed according to the relevant schedule for type of owner.”
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question. People may completely disagree on this question—holding that taxing a pure
SOE is pointless, that it is necessary to ensure fair competition with private firms, or that
it is necessary only because of special features of SOE corporate governance—while all
agreeing that mixed-ownership firms should be taxed. Moreover, different beliefs about
the effect of taxation on a purely state-owned firm may lead to different predictions about
how mixed-ownership firms behave. Focusing immediately on mixed ownership to
explain SOE taxation results in the neglect of the more fundamental question. For this
reason, this article takes the taxation of the purely state-owned firm as the primary
explanandum.
Indeed, the case of the purely state-owned firm is not only conceptually, but also
factually, important. Information about wholly-state-owned firms can be hard to come by.
Many SOEs that do publish financial statements do so because they are listed on stock
exchanges, i.e. they are partially privately-owned. However, this should not lead us to
conclude that mixed-ownership firms are more common or important. According to the
OECD, only 40% of SOEs in the OECD countries have mixed ownership, and only 10%
of this latter group of firms is publicly listed.40 Since fully state-owned enterprises are
generally also subject to the income tax, mixed ownership can at best be part of the
explanation of SOE taxation.
2. Government Claimants Other Than Owners
Let us turn now to the explanation of SOE taxation that refers to the fact that the
level of government benefiting from the corporate tax revenue may not be the level of
government that owns the SOE.41 This is certainly the case in many countries, where
different levels of government may have their own SOEs as well as impose their own
income taxes. Moreover, many countries allow different levels of government to share
corporate income tax revenue according to fixed percentages.42 Thus, for example, the
income tax collected from a firm owned by the central government may be shared
between central and local governments (just like revenue collected from private firms).
When the owner and the tax collector are not the same, it may be suggested, neither
should be indifferent between retained earnings and tax paid.
The response to this explanation is again twofold. First, as already emphasized
above, the question of why a government would tax its own SOE has conceptual priority
and must be independently answered. How it is answered will affect our understanding of
the effect of the presence of multiple layers of government. Consider, for example,
municipally-owned SOEs that are subject to a nationally-imposed income tax, the
40

OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Corporate Governance: Relationship of StateOwned Enterprises with Other Shareholders, CESifo DICE Report 3/2007 (2007) online:
<www.ifo.de/DocCIDL/dicereport307-rr2.pdf>. Some scholars have argued that understanding whollyowned SOEs is much more important than understanding the relatively fewer listed subsidiaries within
SOE groups. Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, “We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China” (2013) 65:4 Stan L Rev 697.
41
See e.g. Hüttemann, supra note 18.
42
See the country surveys in Gianluigi Bizioli & Claudio Sacchetto, eds, Tax Aspects of Fiscal Federalism:
A Comparative Analysis (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2011).
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revenue of which is then shared among national, state and municipal governments. In this
not uncommon situation, the question could be raised: why not simply subject the SOEs
to a lower rate of taxation, one that reflects only the tax revenue that would be received
by government entities other than the SOEs’ municipal owners? Moreover, if the SOEs
might be indifferent to paying tax that accrues to the benefit of their local government
shareholders, do they already behave as though they are subject to a lower tax rate?
Without addressing these questions, we cannot conclude that SOEs are taxed in these
cases only because multiple levels of government are involved.
Conversely, suppose that in many cases (call them “Type A cases”), the
government owner of an SOE is the only claimant to the tax revenue collected from the
SOE. The presence of multiple layers of government would not explain SOE taxation in
Type A cases. But if SOE taxation is found in Types A cases, then in cases where some
claimants to tax revenue are not the SOE’s owner (call these “Type B cases”), SOE
taxation would not be surprising: if a government would be disposed to tax its own SOE,
it might continue to be so disposed even if it has to share the revenue with other
government entities. Type A cases can explain Type B cases, but Type B cases cannot
explain Type A cases.
Second, to argue that SOE taxation performs a distributive function in the context
of multiple layers of government simply pushes the puzzle of SOE taxation to a different
level. If allowing one government entity to tax (or share the tax revenue from) a firm
wholly owned by another government entity merely accomplishes a transfer from the
former to the latter government entity, the question inevitably arises: why not adopt
explicit transfer mechanisms in lieu of taxation?
It may be suggested that the goal is to allow the taxing government entity to share
the undistributed profits of the firm. That is, transfers from one government entity to
another assume that the SOE has made a distribution to the former. If the government
entity that would receive the transfer is concerned about the transferring entity having
incentives to limit distributions, it may want to directly require distributions from the
SOE. Why not, though, make the entity directly a shareholder?43 Recent instances of
temporary nationalization during the global financial crisis and the euro-zone crisis also
offer plenty of illustrations of how the government can be an investor without
significantly affecting management decisions. In light of these alternative mechanisms,
characterizing SOE taxation as serving primarily the purpose of allocating
revenue/profits among different government entities seems unwarranted.
The foregoing arguments lead us to conclude that neither (i) mixed public-private
ownership, nor (ii) non-identity between claimants to SOE tax revenue and the owners of
43

The advantages of such arrangements as opposed to taxation include the flexibility of varying the rate of
distribution for specific SOEs without varying the general tax rate, as well as saving the SOEs from
complex tax computation and compliance efforts. While one may believe it necessary to make one
government entity (say the local government) the controlling shareholder to whom the firm’s managers are
primarily accountable (as would be the case, for example, if the firm is a local public utility or waste
collection business), the other government entity (the central) government can share profits without
exercising control. For example, it may be given non-voting stock.
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SOEs, can be the primary explanations of SOE taxation.44 The gap between the reality of
the ubiquity of SOE taxation and the superfluity view of SOE taxation cannot really be
bridged by these explanations.
II. Is SOE Taxation Necessary So As Not to Disadvantage Private Firms?
According to the “condition of neutrality” view, the taxation of SOEs is explained
and justified by the need to put SOEs on an equal footing with private firms.45 To
evaluate this view, let us first make a definitional clarification. It is well known that
governments themselves may be major investors in equity markets. If a company is
partially-owned (whether directly or indirectly) by the government simply for financial
gain or diversification, it is not an SOE in the typical sense. SOEs “in the typical sense”
represent commitments of public resources made for special reasons: for example, to
allow government control of crucial natural resources or infrastructures of an economy
(e.g. telecom, airlines, postal service, banking, etc).46 Not all firms owned (directly or
indirectly) by the government are of this kind. Thus, a sovereign wealth fund may be an
SOE in the typical sense because it is thought desirable to commit public capital to an
investment pool that enhances the return on a government’s foreign exchange reserves or
accomplishes saving for future generations, etc. But most portfolio companies of
sovereign wealth funds will not be SOEs in the typical sense.
I will call firms whose ownership is acquired by government investors for
financial gain or diversification “incidentally” state-owned. Such firms may seek funding
either from government or private investors, and they compete for private funding with
purely private firms. By contrast, the investment of public funds in SOEs in the typical
sense is a matter of public policy. Typical SOEs cannot freely seek private investment,
because that would amount to privatization. Conversely, most private firms cannot obtain
government funding because the government may not generally seek public control of
production. In other words, typical SOEs and private firms look to different places for
equity financing:47 the former looks to the public budget, and the latter to the financial
market.
It follows immediately that typical SOEs do not compete with private firms for
equity capital: a lower tax rate on the (state’s portion of) SOEs’ profits would not attract
more private capital to them; nor should a higher tax rate (on such portion) send private

44

At best, one could offer some other fundamental reason for taxing SOEs, and cite these two special
circumstances as representing secondary explanations.
45
Note that this is different from the view that firms with mixed public-and-private ownership should be
taxed: the idea is that taxation even of a purely state-owned entity is necessary.
46
See Hans Christiansen, “The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries”, online:
(2011) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 5, OECD Publishing
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-en>.
47
The implications for taxation for the non-equity financing of SOEs are discussed in text accompanying
notes 62-4 infra.
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capital away.48 There is accordingly no question of different income tax treatments of the
two types of firms distorting the competition for capital. Therefore, any distortion of
competition would have to be found in the markets either for other factor inputs or for the
firms’ products. Consider product markets first, and suppose that such markets are
generally competitive. If SOEs enjoy lower costs of capital as a result of being exempt
from taxation, would this result in the SOEs being able to offer lower prices in the
product market?
The answer is No, insofar as state capital is fixed in supply. Even if the SOEs’
cost of equity capital is lower, as long as they cannot utilize more of such capital to
expand production, the lower cost of production would not translate into lower market
prices.49 Now, the idea that state capital is limited in supply simply follows from the
assumption that what amount the state is willing to invest in SOEs is a budgetary decision
determined not primarily by the rate of financial return but by other policy considerations.
To put it another way, at any point above the public rate of discount,50 the government’s
supply of capital to SOEs is inelastic. This means that the incidence of the corporate
income tax should fall entirely upon it. The tax rate applicable to state-owned capital
should not affect the prices of products.
A similar argument can be run for competition in markets for other factor inputs
or for situations where SOEs hold monopolistic or monopsonic positions.51 As long as the
quantity of public capital provided to typical SOEs does not vary with the after-tax rates
of return on such capital, the fear that tax-induced lower cost of capital would create
competitive biases seems base-less.52
This simple argument can be supported by the following theoretical reflection. If
SOEs are able to offer lower product prices because they have a lower cost of capital, this
48

As discussed in Section I, above, for mixed-ownership firms, it is possible to design mechanisms to
ensure that private investors in such firms do not inadvertently benefit from any special tax treatment for
the state-owned portion of the firms’ capital.
49
Such prices are determined by the marginal cost of production—the cost of producing additional units
with additional factor inputs. The lower cost of production of SOEs would merely result in greater producer
surplus (i.e. firm profit).
50
If the rate of return to an investment in an SOE is below the public rate of discount, the government
should not make that investment.
51
For an analysis, see Floyd, supra note 9 (Part III). Note of course that if product or factor markets are
imperfectly competitive, so that SOEs enjoy monopolistic or monopsonic positions in them, private firms
will not be on an equal footing with the SOEs to begin with.
52
This argument was recognized by the IMF economist Robert Floyd in the 1980s, who wrote: “The effects
of differential taxation of public enterprises' profits in this context [of full competition] depend crucially on
the assumption that is made concerning the mobility of capital invested in public enterprises, or, more
importantly, the responsiveness to the rate of return that the assumption represents. So long as the
government's investment decision is based on any considerations other than those affected by tax changes,
capital invested in public enterprises in each industry may be assumed to be fixed exogenously. For
example, the government may establish, solely for national prestige, an automobile plant. In such
circumstances, regardless of whether there is direct or indirect competition in product markets, the
imposition of a profits tax on the earnings of public enterprises affects only those earnings... Since the tax is
imposed only on the return to an essentially "captive" factor of production that is not capable of shifting the
tax by moving to untaxed uses, only that factor bears the tax.” Floyd, supra note 9 at 337-8.
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should be observed even in the absence of any difference in the tax treatment. Consider
what discount rate the government ought to use in deciding whether to invest in an SOE.
When private investors evaluate investment alternatives, the discount rate is generally the
market return to capital. By contrast, when the government evaluates investment options,
it should use the public rate of discount.53 There are different views about how such rate
should be determined.54 One is to make the determination by reference to returns in the
private sector. If the public investment is financed by a tax on private investment, then
the rate should be the before-tax return to private investment. This is because if the
government were to take away $1 from private investors that would have generated x%
of before-tax return in the hands of the latter, the government’s rate of return should not
be less than x%, if the decision to tax were to be socially optimal. If, instead, the public
investment is financed by a tax on private consumption, then the public discount rate
should be the after-tax return to private investment. This is because if an individual
would have received y% of after-tax return if he decided to postpone spending $1 today
and defer consumption to the future, the individual’s opportunity cost of spending the $1
today is 1+y%. That should also be the government’s opportunity cost if it were to take
the $1 away from the individual. Because public funds are obtained through a mix of
taxes on investments and consumption, the public rate of discount should lie between the
before- and after-tax rates of return received by private investors.
Alternatively, one may argue that the government should adopt a social rate of
discount, reflecting a greater concern for future generations.55 This implies a lower rate of
discount than private rates of discount. Thus on either view of how the public rate of
discount is determined, SOEs' cost of equity capital should be lower than the cost of
capital of a private firm (i.e. the before-tax rate of market return). Therefore, if the cost of
equity capital mattered to the product prices charged by SOEs and private firms, SOEs
would be at an advantage even if they are taxed in the same way as private firms. 56 Why
might such a difference in the cost of equity capital not have manifested itself in product
prices charged by SOEs?57 A plausible, general answer is that the supply of public capital
to SOEs is relatively fixed: public capital does not flow in and out of SOEs in response to
price signals.
These conceptual arguments are further supported by the real world fact that in a
number of countries, SOEs have indeed been subject to different tax regimes from
53

When the topic of SOE taxation was discussed in the 1970s and 1980s, public economists may have been
less clear about how to think about the public rate of discount. See e.g. Jenkins, supra note 9 (making the
assumption that the pre-tax returns of the public and private sectors should be the same).
54
See Richard W Tresch, Public Finance: A Normative Theory, 2d ed (San Diego: Academic Press, 2002)
ch 24; Arnold C. Harberger and Glenn P. Jenkins, “Musings on the Social Discount Rate” (2015) Journal of
Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6, pp 6-32.
55
Harvey Rosen, Public Finance, 7th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), at 247-50.
56
This is analogous to the argument that even if non-profit organizations did not receive income tax
exemptions, they would not be “on an equal footing” with for-profit firms, because they would still have a
different (i.e. typically lower) cost of capital. See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), ch 12.
57
The answer is of course obvious if an SOE operates in a monopoly or a market with regulated prices
(which is often the case). In such cases, the argument for taxing SOEs in terms of ensuring fair competition
also loses traction.
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firms—with either lower or higher statutory rates.58 Nonetheless, the suspicion that
treating SOEs differently—especially by applying lower income tax rates or exemptions
to them—would give them unfair advantage (or disadvantage if higher tax rates were
applied) may continue to linger. This suspicion may be fueled by considerations that are
really orthogonal to the issue of how SOEs should be taxed. For example, both SOEs and
private firms also seek other forms of financing, e.g. through loans and financial leases.
Many SOEs enjoy implicit government guarantees and therefore have cheaper borrowing
cost.59 If debt financing is more elastic in supply than public equity capital, then the
borrowing advantage of SOEs may indeed manifest in lower product prices and result in
unfair competition. At the same time, SOEs that borrow a lot will also have greater
interest expense deductions, and their effective corporate income tax rates may
consequently be lower.60 Yet it should be clear that such lower tax effective tax rates are
a consequence, and not cause, of SOEs’ borrowing advantage, which is not itself taxinduced.
Another concern may be that, if SOEs are subject to more favorable tax treatments
than private firms, opportunities for tax arbitrage may emerge: arrangements (typically
through various leasing agreements) may be made by having higher-taxed private firms
recognize deductions while having lower-taxed SOEs recognize income.61 The profits
from the arbitrage may then be shared with the SOEs in the form of cheaper financing
costs. However, tax arbitrage opportunities can arise in the presence of tax-exempt
investors, foreign investors, and investors facing low effective tax rates. They need to be
dealt with through appropriate legal rules even without considering the issue of SOE
taxation. Therefore, the risk of tax arbitrage does not itself justify taxing SOEs just like
private firms.
It may also be suggested that lower income taxation of SOEs would leave more
after-tax profits to SOE managers to invest, and that this would be another form of
financing advantage for SOEs.62 But such an advantage is conditional on the dividend
policy for SOEs—an issue, as will become clear in Section III, requires examination on
its own.
Overall, then, the concern that differential income tax treatments of SOEs and
private firms would result in unfair competition seems to rest on an incoherent
conception of how public capital is deployed. There appears to be little substance behind
the slogan of fairness. As we will see in Sections III and V, the forced distribution view
implies that it may be a desirable policy in some circumstances to subject SOEs to higher
tax rates. The foregoing analysis suggests that this would not have undesirable
consequences in terms of distorting competition with private firms.

58

See Floyd, supra note 9, Part I.
See e.g. Jenkins, supra note 9.
60
Ibid.
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Ibid. Jenkins specifically objected to Canadian publicly-owned corporations entering such arrangements
to obtain additional financing and “circumvent” restrictions imposed by the public budget.
62
See, e.g. Floyd, supra note 9 at 340.
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What about the treatment of incidentally-owned SOEs, for whom public capital
(deployed specifically to seek financial gain and/or diversification) and private capital are
substitutable? As argued in the last Section, for mixed-ownership firms, as long as
corporate income accruing to state shareholders and such income accruing to private
shareholders can be distinguished, they can be taxed differently without creating any
undue advantage over purely private firms. Thus even when there is a type of state capital
that freely flows into and away from firms depending on the firms’ investment returns, as
long as the tax treatment of the return to such capital depends on the ultimate owner of
the capital, and not on the firm that employs it, there should be no distortion of
competition. In any case, the tax treatment of portfolio companies that are the targets of
state investment authorities is again of secondary importance to the subject of how to tax
traditional SOEs.
III. Dividend Policy, the Agency Problem, and SOE Taxation
Sections I and II offered critiques of two prominent traditional views of SOE
taxation, the superfluity view and the “condition of neutrality” view. It is in fact possible
to distil a third view regarding SOE taxation from the prior literature. On this view, SOE
income taxation plays the role of forcing distributions from state-owned firms. For
example, in a paper written for the Economic Council of Canada in the 1980s, Professor
Glenn P. Jenkins argued that
“[when] properly structured, the taxation system tends to be more
effective as a way for the government to extract revenues from its
investments [i.e. SOEs] than are systems of target rates of dividends. The
taxation system has the advantage in that it is…backed up by a legal
system. When it is the same individuals who administer the taxation of
both private and state-owned enterprises, the administrative structure is
usually not as sympathetic to deviations by SOEs as would a government
department that only deals with public enterprises.”63
Interestingly, Professor Jenkins went on in the paper to document how Canadian SOEs
(e.g. Petro-Canada and the Canadian Development Corporation, all of which have been
privatized or dismantled since the 1980s) obtained greater tax benefits (i.e. pay less in tax)
than their private firm counterparts.64 Writing even earlier, but without stressing SOEs’
tendencies to “deviate” from distribution plans, the IMF economist Robert Floyd
highlighted certain advantages of income taxation over dividends as a way of extracting
revenue from SOEs.65
63

Jenkins, supra note 9 at 1, 4-5.
Ibid, at 13.
65
Floyd, supra note 9 at 326-7: “[Taxation] has the advantage of providing both managers of enterprises
and the government with a greater degree of certainty as to the distribution of profits. In contrast, dividends
that are arbitrarily determined and subject to changing political considerations may easily impede efficient
managerial practices. The certainty of control over a portion of profits guaranteed by the use of a profits
tax is likely to impart an incentive to managers of public enterprises to improve the efficiency and
profitability of their operations and, at the same time, to provide them with increased flexibility in their
investment planning and operations.”
64
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At first blush, the proposition that collecting the income tax from SOEs secures
profit distributions to the government shareholder, in a way that perhaps enjoys certain
practical advantages over dividends, may seem little different from the view that taxing
SOEs simply moves funds that the government is entitled to from one “pocket” to another.
The difference is in fact crucial. Even if the income tax paid by an SOE and actually paid
dividends are functionally similar to the government, as long as dividends and retained
earnings are not equivalent, taxes and retained earnings are non-equivalent. The
significance of SOE taxation lies in the challenges of securing dividend payouts from
SOE earnings.
Consider how an SOE makes decisions to distribute profits. One possibility is that
dividend payout policy of a for-profit SOE is analogous to payout decisions of private
firms: in both cases, it should ultimately depend on the investment policy. For a private
firm, retained earnings should be paid out to shareholders if the return from the marginal
corporate investment that could be financed by such earnings is lower than the market
rate of return that shareholders could receive (which is also the corporation’s cost of
raising new equity). That is, retained earnings should be distributed if shareholders have
better use for the fund than the corporation does. For the shareholder of an SOE, i.e. the
government, the opportunity cost of funds is the public rate of discount. At least the range
within which the magnitude of this rate lies can be determined, and if an SOE’s marginal
investment opportunity generates a rate of return lower than the government’s required
rate, it should distribute the retained earnings instead of making the marginal
investment.66
However, it has long been recognized that SOEs face corporate governance
problems, just like private enterprises.67 For both types of firms, the managers of a firm
often have preferences different from the firm’s shareholders, including with respect to
dividend payout. Managers may favor investments generating low returns because they
expand the managers’ scope of power, allowing them to build empires. Low-return
investments could also take the form of pet projects, etc. All of these allow managers to
derive benefits in addition to their compensation, as determined by shareholders. While
managers have better access to information regarding the expected return from potential
investments than shareholders, they are typically motivated by objectives others than
ensuring that investments returns are at least equal to shareholders’ opportunity cost.68
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Setting payoff policy may be easier for SOEs than for private firms in certain respects. One is the
absence of any shareholder-level tax. The tax on dividends received by individual shareholders within the
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For private firms, two typical ways of alleviating this agency problem are (i)
increasing monitoring by shareholders, and (ii) granting equity compensation to
managers, so that they too would benefit from payouts.69 While method (ii) is relatively
straightforward, it has been recognized that method (i) is feasible only for large
shareholders: small shareholders face the free rider problem because the marginal cost of
monitoring exceeds the marginal benefit of doing so. Empirical studies have shown that it
is indeed the firms that have more concentrated ownership and greater ownership by
managers that pay dividends in larger amounts.70
If an SOE is already partially privatized (and perhaps listed on a stock market),
equity compensation could be used to induce the appropriate level of payout, similar to
the case of private firms. In such a case, private investor monitoring or investorprotection law requiring distributions may already increase the likelihood of
distribution.71 However, for a wholly-owned SOE, making managers partial owners of
the enterprise would involve partial privatization, which is rarely carried out just for the
purpose of creating incentives for SOE managers to make profit distributions.
Alternatively, one could design incentive contracts where managers are compensated not
just for the level of profits but also for making distributions. The issue is whether such
contracts can be effective. An extensive empirical literature has generally cast doubt on
the effectiveness of incentive contracts in enhancing SOE performance. At least in the
past, experiments with such contracts have been unable to incorporate terms that reduce
the information asymmetry between managers and government owners.72 Consequently,
productivity gains have not been observed. One may therefore also be skeptical about
whether such contracts can increase payouts.73
Turning to monitoring, there is certainly no free rider problem when the
government is either the sole or a very substantial shareholder. However, the failure of
government owners to adequately monitor SOE performance is one of the fundamental
reasons for the push for privatization in many countries in the first place.74 This failure
has been attributed to various causes such as the presence of multiple principals, ill-
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See Mary M Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, “Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical
Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises” (1998) 14:1 JL Econ Org 358; Mary M
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defined stakeholders, and government appointed monitors who “do not have their wealth
at stake when executing their monitoring duties.”75
Further aggravating the difficulties of implementing managerial incentives and
adequate monitoring is a fundamental institutional challenge to formulating SOE
dividend policy. Unlike private firms, SOEs must go to the government for new equity
capital. If a country has only a few SOEs, it is conceivable for the government to approve
new funding for them as part of the budgetary process. But when a government holds
stakes in tens or hundreds of SOEs, it is harder to imagine that each individual SOE’s
fund-raising proposal could be meaningfully examined through the budgetary process.
More likely, funding proposals would be aggregated and approved on that basis. In such
an arrangement, it is possible for SOE managers to feel that they do not have the same
flexibility and opportunity to compete for funding in the way private firms do. They
might therefore take a conservative stance towards profit distributions. In other words, it
could be difficult to tell whether the SOEs are withholding information from the
government shareholder, or whether they are not offering information because they
expect the information to be lost anyway.
To be sure, the last word has yet to be said about whether it’s possible to
incentivize SOE managers to distribute profits, and whether better monitoring of SOEs
by the government can ensure that retained earnings are not re-invested in unpromising
projects. Nonetheless, these options for ensuring optimal payout policies have been far
from successful, at least where a country’s public sector is very large.76 Where SOE
dividend policies are difficult to formulate due both to the lack of market mechanisms
and to the size of the SOE sector, the divergence of interests between managers and
shareholders can be expected to lead to sub-optimally low payouts. In such circumstances,
taxing SOEs’ income may be a way of ensuring that at least a portion of the firms’ profits
are periodically distributed to the public fisc. It has been argued that forced distributions
in other types of firms, e.g. partnerships, REITs, RICs, etc, reduce the need for corporate
governance mechanisms for such business entities.77 From this perspective, the taxation
of SOEs may play a rather important role in improving social efficiency in contexts
where corporate governance of SOEs malfunctions (or is nearly non-existent).
It may be useful to compare traditional SOEs, characterized by the agency
problem in payout policy described above, with public sector pension funds, which (in
Canada and elsewhere) are often government-owned or government-controlled. The
predominant tax treatment for public pension funds is exemption, in sharp contrast to the
taxation of traditional SOEs.78 This contrast may reflect the following differences
75
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between government-controlled pension funds and other SOEs. First, pension funds have
well-defined liabilities, i.e. pension obligations to retirees, with which investments should
be matched.79 They thus face inherent distribution requirements, which reduce the need to
use taxation to force distribution. Second, pension funds also receive ongoing
contributions independently of the government budgetary process. Managers of public
pensions therefore may be more immune to the difficulties of raising funds for desirable
projects, and therefore have fewer incentives to hoard cash. There are, of course, other
important policy reasons for exempting pension funds from taxation (whether they are
government-controlled or not), such as implementing consumption tax treatment of
earnings saved for retirement. But what is worth noting is that the agency problem for
payout policy is also less significant in the context of public pension funds, making tax
exemption a natural choice.
In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that the problem of securing
adequate payout from SOEs may be of fundamental institutional significance: it is not a
problem that one could simplify away, as the superfluity view of SOE taxation does in
failing to distinguish between dividends and retained earnings. Whether this suggestion is
plausible—whether the aversion to dividend payouts of SOE managers is more than just a
subject of occasional, anecdotal interest—may be the core difference between the
superfluity view and the “forced distribution” view.80 Yet this difference in opinion is
capable of being adjudicated empirically, because the “forced distribution” view implies
that SOEs—or, more precisely, their managers—are sensitive to taxes, contrary to the
superfluity view.81 It implies that taxes and after-tax profits have different values both for
the state owner of the firm and for the firm’s managers: taxes are corporate profits taken
away from the control of manager, thus insulated from the risk of being invested in lowreturn projects (a good from the government’s point of view) and reducing the private
benefits of corporate profits (a bad from the managers’ perspective).82 Thus if proper
means are identified to measure the sensitivity of firms to the income tax, the finding of a
significant level of SOE tax sensitivity would vindicate the forced distribution view.
In our time, when SOEs are highly active in many countries,83 it should not be
surprising that such empirical evidence is in fact available. Before citing such evidence,
however, the next Section will first lay out a conceptual analysis of SOE response to
taxation, which shows that the degree of SOE sensitivity is a contingent matter, and
depends on numerous aspects of the principal-agent relationship between SOE managers
Article 13, paragraph 28.8; and Commentary on Article 18, paragraph 69 (pension funds are generally tax
exempt in the home country, and, to ensure neutrality between domestic and foreign investments, treaty
partners may negotiate reciprocal exemptions for pension funds from source-country tax on passive
income).
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and the government shareholders. This is important for two reasons. First, as a matter of
intellectual history, although some scholars sympathetic to the forced distribution view
may have had strong intuitions about the significance of agency problems in SOEs,84 the
vast body of research on corporate governance in general and on the agency problem in
payout policy in particular emerged during and after the 1980s, when privatization of
previous SOEs already began to sweep through Europe, Canada, and elsewhere. Thus
while the forced distribution view is crucially based on the identification of a corporate
governance problem, it has not so far made use of the research on corporate governance
to articulate the basic intuitions. The analysis in the next Section attempts to make a first
step in remedying this situation. Second, in the emerging empirical literature on SOE tax
sensitivity, there is a range of findings, but a theory that allows one to compare and
reconcile such findings has been lacking. This article suggests that a detailed conceptual
analysis, taking seriously the idea that SOE managers are no more likely to be perfect
agents of their principals than are private managers, may be precisely what is needed to
understand a wide range of real world phenomena.
IV. How Sensitive Are SOEs to the Income Tax? An Analytic Model
Previous authors have suggested that since the government controls the
compensation package of SOE managers, it can link the latter’s compensation to beforetax rather than after-tax profits, since (on the traditional view of SOEs) retained earnings
and taxes are equally valuable to the government shareholder.85 Given that managers of
private firms are generally compensated for after-tax profits, if the compensation
formulae used for the two types of firms are comparable, lesser SOE tax-sensitivity
seems logically to follow. Even if there is no direct documentation of the compensation
of SOE managers on the basis of pre-tax profits, any reduced tax sensitivity on the part of
SOEs may be taken as indirect evidence. Moreover, SOEs sometimes publicly tout their
tax payments as contributions,86 suggesting that they are interested in getting “social
credit” for such payments. This is distinct from SOE managers getting political or
economic rewards for SOE tax payments, but lends the latter plausibility
Indeed, additional factors may also be at play, relating to the effect of tax on
shareholder value and on the amount of corporate earnings at the managers’ disposal.
Consider a stylized model of the choices faced by a private firm’s manager regarding
dividend payouts. The manager must allocate corporate retained earnings between (i)
paying dividends, (ii) investments generating future returns that benefit shareholders, and
(iii) uses that benefit only the manager and not shareholders.87 The third category
84
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encompasses all ways in which managers’ objectives may diverge from shareholders, and
may consist in “allocation of funds to perks, tunneling, a taste for empire building, or a
preference for projects that lead to a ‘quiet life’.”88 All items in this category will be
labeled “pet projects” below. Consistent with the discussion in Section III, the manager’s
choice in the model is a function of the degree of management ownership and of
shareholder monitoring for the firm. Management ownership increases the direct
financial benefit the manager may receive from uses (i) and (ii), whereas shareholder
monitoring determines the amount of weight the manager attaches to shareholder benefits
generated by such uses. Both arrangements counter-balance the manager’s incentive to
allocate retained earnings to uses of type (iii), i.e. pet projects. The ability of the manager
to allocate earnings for his private benefit, of course, is also a function of monitoring.89
Suppose that given choices made about management ownership and the degree of
shareholder monitoring, the private firm manager still siphons $µ from each $1 of
corporate funds for pet projects. How does this affect the firm’s sensitivity to the
corporate income tax? To the shareholder of the firm, the disvalue of the firm paying $1
of tax, leaving $1 less of after-tax profits, is the disvalue of losing $(1- µ) of any other
kind of fund: this is because $µ from each $1 of corporate retained earnings would not
have been put to uses that benefit the shareholders anyway!90 (Of course, this amount µ is
not observable to the shareholders.) This means the misuse of corporate retained earnings
reduces the tax sensitivity of shareholders, and therefore the tax sensitivity of the
manager as (i) a fiduciary of the shareholders, and (ii) himself a shareholder. On the
other hand, the manager is adversely affected by the $1 of tax paid as he has $µ less
available for his pet projects.91 All these factors are additional to any effect of corporate
tax on the manager’s non-equity based compensation.
Now consider the incentives of an SOE manager. Again, to be consistent with
Section III above, let’s suppose that he does not own any shares of the firm (i.e. the SOE
has not been privatized.) Let’s also assume that the level of shareholder monitoring is
fixed, possibly at a lower level than at a private firm because of the lack of incentives on
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the part of the bureaucrats acting on behalf of the state owner. Given these assumptions,
suppose that for any $1 of corporate fund, the manager allocates $π to pet projects.92
For an SOE, any amount of tax paid creates no disvalue to the shareholder—
because the government is the shareholder. Compared to the private firm manager, the
SOE manager, in his capacity as a fiduciary, should thus be less sensitive to tax. By
hypothesis, he also does not suffer as a shareholder. Thus the SOE manager suffers from
the tax paid only because it reduces the amount of funds allocable to pet projects. Yet if
the SOE manager is generally able to allocate more retained earnings to pet projects (i.e.
π> µ), he suffers more in this regard from the tax payment than the private firm manager.
Overall, therefore, whether the SOE manager or the private firm manager is more tax
sensitive depends on (i) the level of monitoring in each type of firm, and (ii) the amount
of management ownership in the private firm.93
Examining the agency problem in SOE management introduces yet another
reason why SOEs might be less tax-sensitive than private firms. For an SOE’s
government shareholder, tax paid by the firm not only represents no disvalue, it is in fact
worth more than the same amount kept as corporate retained earnings, since an
(unobservable) portion of such latter funds would be used for pet projects. By contrast,
the tax payment has a negative value for the SOE manager. Hence it is possible for the
government to give the manager some incremental “credit” for paying $1 of tax: as long
as the magnitude of the credit is smaller than $π, the government is better off, while the
manager will be less averse to paying the tax.94
Let’s look more closely at why any government should ever “give credit” to SOE
managers for paying tax. If taxing SOEs is essentially a matter of forcing distributions at
a fixed rate, and if, let us suppose, that rate has not been set sub-optimally high,95 giving
credit for paying taxes amounts to giving back what the government has bargained for in
setting the tax rate. Why should the government do that? The answer is that, insofar as an
SOE’s payment of tax causes no detriment to the shareholder but only hurts the manager,
inducing the SOE manager to pay taxes is similar to inducing him to make distributions.
On the one hand, with respect to payments of taxes, the government suffers fewer
92
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disadvantages from information asymmetry than with respect to the manager’s use of
corporate funds in general. To reduce tax payments, an SOE can either legally engage in
tax planning, or illegally attempt to evade taxes. Both can, at least in theory, be
discovered through proper auditing, and tax evasion can simply be stopped. On the other
hand, to the extent that an SOE can legally reduce or delay paying taxes, the government
is precisely not in a position to force distributions through taxation. It must induce them.
The logic here is analogous to granting the managers of private enterprises equity
compensation in order to address the managers’ dividend averseness.96
In summary, SOE managers may be more tax sensitive than private firm
managers because:
(1) thanks to weaker corporate governance, they have greater leeway to use firm
funds for pet projects. In other words, the opportunity cost for the SOE
manager of the tax paid is higher.
However, they may be less tax sensitive than private firm managers because:
(2) The former’s compensation may be linked to pre-tax, as opposed to post-tax,
profits;
(3) The former are not motivated to reduce taxes in their capacity as fiduciaries
for shareholders, since the government shareholder suffers no disutility from
tax payments; and
(4) The former may be given extra incentives by the government to pay taxes, just
as private firm managers may be given extra incentives to make profit
distributions.
This analysis shows that how sensitive SOEs are to the corporate income tax is a
contingent, empirical matter. It depends on strength of factor (1) relative to the aggregate
effect of factors (2)-(4). The efficiency of taxation as a method of forcing distributions
from SOEs, therefore, also depends on the above empirical factors.
It is useful to contrast the analysis adopted here, which analyzes SOE tax
sensitivity in terms of the SOE manager’s expected value from a marginal dollar of
corporate profits, with another model of the interaction between corporate taxation and
corporate governance offered by Desai, Dyck and Zingales (“DDZ”).97 These authors
study the impact of taxation in the private firm context—they thus do not try to explain
the very fact of taxing firms, as I try to for SOEs—and argue that taxation may
compensate for weak corporate governance. But the mechanism by which they envision
this to happen is quite different from those sketched above.
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In the DDZ model, “insiders”—controlling shareholders who also act as
managers—divert funds from both outside shareholders and the tax authority. That is,
insiders are conceived of as hiding income from both the tax collector and other
shareholders, engaging simultaneously in “theft” and tax evasion. Therefore, the fund
insiders divert for their own use comes from pre-tax, and not after-tax, income. A high
corporate tax rate increases the opportunity cost of not diverting, since diverted funds are
not subject to tax at all, whereas non-diverted funds accrue to the benefit of the “insider”
shareholder only after tax has been paid. Thus all other things equal, a high tax rate
renders the corporate governance problem worse. The beneficial effect of taxation in the
DDZ model comes instead from tax enforcement: because diversion is equivalent to tax
evasion under the model, the tax collector, by reducing tax evasion, also reduces
diversion.
By contrast, our discussion does not conceive of managers as hiding income: the
funds used for “pet projects” come from after-tax revenue. Most fundamentally, this is
because I (like Chetty and Saez) focus on agency problems in determining payout policy:
managers are not “stealing,” they are just not presenting accurate information about
investment opportunities to shareholders.98 This is more consistent with the traditional
(and, I believe, correct) conception of the agency problem for SOEs as lying primarily in
between managers and the state shareholder, and not between insiders and minority
shareholders. As DDZ admit, their model does not consider empire-building, and “is
more appropriate characterizing countries where large shareholders dominate and the
main agency problem is the conflict between insiders and minority shareholders.”99
Because the fundamental issue examined in this article is why SOEs are taxed in the first
place, where to set the tax rate and levels of enforcement are secondary questions. To
address the more fundamental issue, the agency problem in payout policy is of primary
significance.
While the preceding analytical discussion may strike some readers as purely
speculative, SOEs responses to taxation, like the dividend policies of private firms,
actually are the subject of an active area of empirical research. For example, a widelycited study100 reports that among listed companies in Malaysia, observed effective
corporate income tax rates are lower for those with greater state ownership, relative to
private firms with otherwise similar firm characteristics. Lower effective tax rates (ETRs)
have also been reported for SOEs owned by the central government in China:101 in fact,
the Chinese studies are more striking, because some of the SOEs display lower ETRs
even after the researchers controlled for a very wide range of relevant firm
characteristics.102 This should seem puzzling even if we do not assume SOEs to be
98
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indifferent to paying taxes: why, being subject to the same tax system as private firms,
should SOEs end up paying less tax? Among the different theories of SOE taxation, only
the forced distribution view seems to offer a solution: the opportunity cost for the SOE
manager of the tax paid is higher.
The empirical evidence on SOE taxation is in reality more complex. For example,
research on Chinese SOEs shows that SOEs owned by subnational governments have
higher ETRs than comparable private firms, which is more consistent with the view that
SOEs are indifferent to taxation. However, a subgroup of such studies shows that
subnational SOEs’ ETRs appear to be negatively correlated with enterprise autonomy and
the effectiveness of managerial incentives to generate profit.103 In directly examining
SOEs tax responsiveness, some studies have found that SOEs are less sensitive than
comparable private firms to changes in tax rates and the tax base,104 while others find that
SOEs engage in similar tax planning as private firms.105 These findings are not
necessarily inconsistent with one another: researchers are still refining their
methodologies and measurements. But overall, it is fair to say that, as an empirical matter,
it is no longer news that SOEs (whether with full or partial government ownership) may
behave like “real” taxpayers. The conceptual analysis offered in this Section is not only
consistent with this emerging, exciting body of scholarship, it can further motivates such
research by providing it with a theoretical underpinning.
V. Policy Implications
The forced distribution theory of SOE taxation elaborated in the last two sections
has many policy implications, which I will illustrate in this section in connection with
international tax policy. As discussed in the Introduction, SOEs from many different
countries have been internationally active.106 This raises important tax policy questions
for both countries that are the home of SOEs and countries that play hosts to foreign SOE
investors. For the former, for example, it may be asked whether traditional international
rules for taxing foreign income, such as the granting of foreign tax credits for foreign
income tax paid, or, alternatively, the exemption of foreign income from home taxation,
will have the same effect on SOEs as on private firms. For the latter, by contrast, the
question may be whether to welcome or discourage SOE investment, and what it means
to ensure that private foreign investors compete on a level playing field with foreign
SOEs.
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To answer either question, we should start with the premise that SOEs are subject
to income taxation in their home countries—which is much more likely the case than not.
But we might also assume that SOEs are less sensitive to paying the home country
income tax than private firms. As discussed in Section IV, this may be because the
government owner of the SOE makes the SOE’s managers’ compensation linked to pretax, as opposed to post-tax, profits, and may even give extra credit to the managers to pay
taxes (just as private firm managers may be given extra incentives to make profit
distributions). Moreover, SOE managers, in their fiduciary role, may not be motivated to
reduce taxes, since the government shareholder suffers no disutility from tax payments.
Thus for domestic investments, SOEs effectively enjoy, in a hidden way, a lower tax rate:
this lower tax rate is not reflected in the amount of tax payment made to the government;
instead it corresponds to how much the domestic tax “hurts” the SOE manager.
This, however, ceases to be the case when it comes to foreign taxes. Any foreign
tax paid by an SOE is of no value to the SOE’s government shareholder. Consequently,
there is no reason for such shareholder to compensate SOE managers on the basis of preforeign-tax profits. As fiduciaries, the SOE managers should also aim to reduce foreign
taxes. In other words, when an SOE pays a dollar of domestic tax and a dollar of foreign
tax, although the monetary amount of the tax is the same, the former payment has a lower
“subjective” cost for the SOE—in the sense of a lower impact on the behavior of the SOE
manager.
SOEs thus may be expected to try to minimize foreign taxes on their foreign
income, much like tax-exempt investors (i.e. pension funds), or multinationals whose
foreign income are effectively subject to exemption treatment in their home countries.
This, however, is not noteworthy in itself. What is noteworthy is that the discrepancy
between foreign and domestic tax payments for an SOE has the following implications
for the SOE’s choice between domestic and foreign investments (see the Appendix for a
full example). First, under many countries’ tax regimes, domestic tax is imposed on a
resident corporation’s worldwide income, while a credit is given to the resident
corporation for foreign income taxes that it has paid on its foreign income.107 For private
firms, the foreign tax credit (FTC) serves to neutralize differences in tax rates imposed by
different countries: the taxpayer has to pay the same domestic rate of tax on income
wherever it earns it, therefore it may be encouraged to seek the highest pre-tax return
from investments wherever they arise.108 However, this mechanism is likely to fail to
achieve neutrality for SOEs: if a dollar of foreign tax paid has a higher disutility than a
dollar of domestic tax paid because the SOE is less sensitive to the domestic tax, a dollarfor-dollar FTC will not make the SOE indifferent between domestic and foreign taxes.
Second, alongside FTC mechanisms, many countries also adopt an exemption
approach to the foreign income (usually active income) of resident corporations: the
(active) foreign income earned by resident corporate taxpayer may be subject only to
107
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foreign taxes (if any) imposed by the countries where the income arises, but not to any
home country tax.109 The exemption approach may have the effect of encouraging
domestic private firms to invest abroad when foreign tax rates are lower (and putting the
domestic private firm on an equal footing with foreign investors with respect to foreign
investments).110 However, this effect may again be absent for SOEs: faced with two
otherwise similar investments, one at home that is subject to a domestic tax rate of 25%,
another abroad that is subject to a foreign tax at a lower, 20% rate, the SOE may still
choose the domestic investment, since 25 cents of domestic tax paid may still possess less
disutility to the SOE manager than 20 cents of foreign tax paid.
In other words, traditional principles of neutrality in international taxation were
based on the assumption that investors “feel the pain” of all taxes, whether domestic or
foreign. This is true for private investors, but it may not be true for SOEs. For the latter,
traditional tax policy instruments seem to have indeterminate effects. Might SOEs engage
in more aggressive tax planning abroad than private firms, for example, given that their
home governments are not effectively absorbing the cost of foreign taxes through FTCs?
The problem also goes beyond FTC or exemption mechanisms: unless SOEs’ response to
taxes is better understood, what can be said of their propensity to use tax havens?111 For
countries that are home to many SOE multinationals, the objectives of international tax
policy may thus be far from clear.
The discrepancy between foreign and domestic tax payments for an SOE also has
striking implications for their competitive positions vis-à-vis private investors. This is
because foreign SOEs seem to suffer from an inherent comparative disadvantage relative
to private investors when investing abroad.112 In a domestic context, while an SOE and a
private enterprise may pay the same amount of tax, the payment has a lower impact on
the behavior of the SOE manager—it is as if the SOE enjoys a hidden, lower rate. But
there is no such disparity between SOEs and private enterprises when they invest abroad:
they should be “hurt” the same by each dollar of foreign tax paid. To put it differently,
while private firms can be assumed to be indifferent between a dollar of domestic tax
paid and a dollar of foreign tax paid, SOEs prefer paying the dollar of domestic tax. All
other things equal, then, an SOE has a comparative advantage for investing in domestic
taxable transactions, and a private enterprise enjoys such an advantage investing in
taxable transactions abroad, because its relative cost for such investments is lower.113
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We can add to this the less subtle consideration that some powerful SOEs can
expect to obtain special preferential treatments domestically. Such treatments are
generally not available on foreign investments. Thus, paradoxically, the greater the
domestic political clout an SOE possesses, the more comparative advantage it has to lose
when it decides to invest abroad. This points goes well beyond tax policy. In a number of
emerging economies such as China, SOEs are generally credited with many privileges in
making foreign investments:114 the power to win approval under regimes of capital
control, the ability to get financing for large investments, and, most fundamentally, the
outsized amount of retained earnings that allow one to consider foreign acquisitions to
begin with.115 However, these privileges are correlated with a large set of other
advantages SOEs enjoy at home, many of which are lost as soon as SOEs step beyond
their national borders.
Interestingly, the comparative disadvantage of SOEs investing abroad creates
room for host countries to offer select incentives to foreign SOEs to make greater
investments—if that is desired116—without the fear that, simply because these incentives
are not simultaneously given to private investors, the latter are put at a disadvantage. If
SOEs are at a comparative disadvantage to private firms, then inducements may be
harmlessly offered to SOEs up to the point where their comparative disadvantage
disappears. Such incentives can be offered in both tax117 and other policy areas. The U.S.,
for example, currently offers tax incentives to certain foreign SOEs both under domestic
law (Internal Revenue Code Section 892118) and in U.S.’ tax treaties. For example, it is
common for the U.S. to offer in its tax treaties exemptions for interest on loans made by
foreign governments and government-owned lenders, even though the U.S. itself does not
always expect actual reciprocal benefits. Australia has pursued a similar policy through
the Australian Tax Office’s administrative practice.119 Such policies have evoked
expressions of disbelief from some commentators, who find it incredible that a country
like the U.S. would favor “state capitalism” over “private capitalism”.120 In fact, however,
such policy may make perfect sense from the perspective of the host country’s national
interest, if it operates within the space of foreign SOEs’ comparative disadvantage. Here,
as elsewhere, the claim that SOEs should be treated equally with private firms turns out
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to be hollow, once it is recognized that these two types of firms may not operate on a
“level playing field” to start with.121
Conclusion
The forced distribution theory of SOE taxation developed in this article can be
summarized as making three basic claims. First, it holds that corporate governance
problems, especially at wholly-stated-owned firms, make securing adequate dividend
distributions a systematic challenge, and that SOE taxation should be viewed as an
institutional response to this challenge. This claim is in part motivated by the observation
that SOE taxation is very widespread, and that it cannot be justified as a condition
necessary for securing competitive neutrality between state-owned and private firms, nor
by ad hoc references to mixed-ownership firms, etc. The claim may nonetheless be
surprising to some readers, who may believe that partial privatization has been the main
approach adopted to solve SOE corporate governance problems: that an institution
remains widely adopted mainly to solve such problems despite privatization may strike
them heterodox. This first claim also implies that the greater SOE corporate governance
problems a country has that are relevant to dividend payouts, the more likely the country
is to rely on SOE taxation. The claim certainly requires further refinement to be
empirically tested.
The second claim made by the forced distribution theory is more intuitive and
easier to verify. It is that SOEs should be expected to be sensitive to tax, even if SOE
managers are compensated on the basis of pre-tax profits. The fundamental intuition is
that income tax paid by SOEs and SOE dividends may all go to the same government; but
precisely because SOE managers are dividend-averse, they are tax-averse as well. To
anyone who has studied or observed how SOEs deal with their income tax obligations,
the claim that SOEs are tax-sensitive to a significant extent (sometime to degrees that
match or even exceed the tax sensitivity of private firms) is almost uncontroversial.122
Such real world observations, however, put strong stress on the orthodox public finance
view that SOE taxation should have few behavioral consequences and is superfluous. As
mentioned in the Introduction, most OECD countries now have limited public sectors,
and empirical patterns in SOE taxation are rarely scrutinized. However, in many other
countries, striking patterns in SOE taxation have been found, and can be explained only if
one abandons the orthodox theory.
Finally, this article claims that the justification for SOE taxation, as well as SOEs’
degree of tax sensitivity, have important policy implications. The discussion of such
implications in connection with international taxation in the last Section offers only
limited illustrations, and it is easy to see that there are more. For example, in countries
with significant SOE presence, the view that SOEs should be subject to the income tax in
just the same way as private firms to ensure competitive neutrality, is quite prevalent.
However, I have argued that this view is misguided in a fundamental sense. SOEs are
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different from private firms in that the supply of state capital to SOEs is inelastic (above a
certain point) to the rate of return on such capital. Thus the benefit (or burden) of a lower
(or higher) rate of taxation on state-supplied capital than the rate of tax imposed on
private firms is received (or borne) only by the state shareholder itself, and should not
result in competitive advantages or disadvantages for SOEs. It follows that the
implementation of SOE taxation should be evaluated in light not of some unreflective
notion of fairness or neutrality, but of the basic nature of SOE taxation as a mechanism
for forced distributions. The important goals are of ensuring adequate payout of SOE
profits, while minimizing tax-induced distortions and avoiding unintended consequences
that may arise from adopting the same tax system for both SOEs and private firms.
This article suggests that as a widely-adopted mechanism for forcing SOE
distributions, taxation may have played an unrecognized, salutary role in disciplining
SOE managers.123 If it weren't for the tax system, SOEs could have been even more
unproductive. However, using the tax system to accomplish two drastically different
purposes—to raise tax revenue for private firms, and to force distributions for SOEs—
risks reducing the efficiency of the system in accomplishing its normal, revenue-raising,
objective. This begs the question of whether better mechanisms of corporate governance
for SOEs can be found: might there be other feasible mandatory distribution mechanisms,
for example? An explicit awareness of the explanation of the prevalence of SOE taxation
as an institution of forcing distributions may help one to explore such alternatives.
From the perspective of countries (such as Canada) that no longer have large
public sectors, the most widely-shared policy concern regarding foreign SOE investments
has been political: the fear is about foreign-government control of these investments and
their use for political purposes.124 However, commentators have also urged caution in
acting on this fear, as irresistible as it might be. The theory advanced in this article offers
the beginning of a rational perspective in thinking about the political threat posed by
foreign SOEs. According to the theory, the pervasiveness of SOE taxation in the world is
explained by the fundamental fact that SOE managers are no more perfect agents for the
SOEs’ government owners than private firm managers are for their shareholders. If a
sensible scheme for distributions from SOEs to their government owners could easily be
devised, there would be no point to taxing SOEs. But precisely because such scheme
often cannot be found, there is a role for SOE taxation to play. The widespread use of
SOE taxation suggests that the problems for transmitting investment information from
SOEs to their government owners could be massive. Otherwise we should not observe a
situation (which obtains in a number of countries) where taxation is the main form in
which state-owned productive assets contribute to the public fisc—this would be
completely contrary to the predictions of public finance theory.
It is quite likely that such asymmetries in information are systematic, which
makes government control of SOE decisions rather difficult. Moreover, SOEs can
significantly shape—and distort—the development of the domestic legal systems,
resulting in preferences and policy initiatives that could not otherwise have been expected.
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The picture that the SOE manager merely acts at the behest of the government can be all
too far from reality. Instead, SOE managers form an independent interest group shaping
policy outcomes. A political theory of government control of SOEs is needed to
understand these interactions. While this article neither offers nor makes use of such a
theory, it clearly demonstrates the need for one.
Appendix
The interaction between the logic of SOE taxation and the standard approaches in
international tax policy can be illustrated through the following example. Suppose that
there are two countries: A, the home country, has a corporate income tax rate of 25%, and
B, the source country, taxes income received by foreigners at 20%. Country A has two
firms: P, a private firm, and S, an SOE. Both P and S are considering investments either
at home or in B. The investment opportunities in A and B generate equal pre-tax returns:
for the same amount of investment, each gives rise to 100 of income. Based on the
analysis in Section IV, we assume that S is less insensitive to tax in A than P. In the
extreme case, where S’ manager receives enough recognition for any amount of tax
payment to A’s government,125 S is completely insensitive to the domestic tax.
Consider three different approaches to outbound tax policy that country A might
adopt, all of which apply equally to P and S.126 Under the first, foreign taxes are deducted
like other business expenses when computing tax liability in A. Under the second, A
exempts foreign income received by P or S from taxation. Under the third policy, for an
investment in B, A would give a foreign tax credit. Although the numerical results of
these different policies are the same for P and S, what the results mean for them differ. In
the following, we will interpret the meaning of these different results for P and S, and
compare them with the baseline case of an investment in A.
Domestic Investment
Both P and S would pay 25 of tax on 100 of investment income and keep 75 as
returned earnings. If the manager of S is recognized in some way for the tax payment S
makes to A’s government (as if the payment is a distribution), then, in the extreme case,
the 25 of tax payment has the same value to the manager of S as 25 of additional retained
earnings. In the intermediate case, the benefit the manager of S derives from the 100 of
domestic income is greater than the benefit he derives from the 75 of retained earnings
but less than 100 of retained earnings. For P’s manager, however, only the 75 of retained
earnings is of value.
Foreign Investment with Deduction of Foreign Tax
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For an investment in B that generates 100 of income and 20 of tax liability owed
to B, A would collect 20 (=25%*(100-20)) as tax from P or S, leaving 60 to the taxpayer.
Any foreign tax paid is of no value to S’ government shareholder. Hence for managers of
P and S alike, the tax paid to B generates no benefit whatsoever. S’ manager is still better
off than P’s manager in that he can get recognition for the 20 of tax payable to A. But
both are worse off in comparison with the option of investing domestically: both have
only 60 (as opposed to 75) of retained earnings, and of the total 40 of foreign and
domestic taxes paid, S manager can get recognition only for 20, whereas P’s manager
gets none. The deduction method thus successfully discourages both P and S from make
foreign investments.
Foreign Investment with Exemption
With the exemption method, P would pay 20 of tax to B on an investment in B
and have 80 left that is exempt from tax in A. For P, this is an improvement over both the
option of investing domestically and the deduction-for-foreign-tax treatment. The
exemption method thus favors foreign investments over domestic investments for the
private firm.
It is S’ response to the exemption method that highlights what’s special about
SOE taxation. First, note that if S is insensitive to domestic tax, the exemption method
offers no improvement over the deduction method. Under both methods, 20 of foreign tax
is paid that has no value to S’ manager. While S has 20 more of retained earnings under
the exemption method than under the deduction method, in the extreme case of taxinsensitivity, the 20 of domestic paid under the deduction method has as much value to S’
manager as 20 of retained earnings. Even in the intermediate case where S is less
sensitive to domestic tax than M, but not insensitive, the improvement brought by the
exemption method over the deduction method is less dramatic for S than it is for P.
Second and more importantly, the exemption method may fail to make the foreign
investment more attractive to S than the domestic investment, despite the lower foreign
tax rate. This is clearest in the extreme case, where S’ manager derives value from all 100
of the domestic investment income (whether the 75 portion of retained earnings or the 25
portion of tax paid), whereas for the foreign investment, he derives value only from 80.
The nature of the bargain struck between A and S’ manager makes it impossible to
improve on the domestic investment from a tax perspective. Given the chance to invest in
A, therefore, S’ manager would not invest in B, notwithstanding the lower tax rate in B.
Even in the intermediate case where S is not completely insensitive to tax, if S’
manager’s benefit from the 25 of domestic tax paid is greater than what he could derive
from 5 of additional retained earnings, he would prefer the domestic investment. In
summary, if an SOE is less sensitive to domestic tax than a private firm, the exemption of
foreign income may well fail to encourage the SOE to invest abroad.
Foreign Investment with Foreign Tax Credit (FTC)
Under the FTC method, P’s investment in B results in 25 of total tax payment (20
to B and 5 to A) and 75 of retained earnings. This is (i) better than under the deduction
method, (ii) just as good as a domestic investment, and (iii) not as good as the exemption
method’s treatment of an investment in B.
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On the other hand, the effect of the FTC method on S is again distorted by the
bargain between S’ manager and A. If S is completely domestic-tax-insensitive, then just
like the exemption method, getting foreign tax credit for tax paid to B offers no
improvement over the deduction method. This is because S’ manager will get recognition
for the 5 of residual tax paid to A and have 75 of retained earnings. By hypothesis, this is
the same—for a tax-insensitive S—as getting recognition for 20 of tax paid to A and
having 60 of retained earnings (the deduction method) and having 80 of retained earnings
(the exemption method). All are inferior, from S’ manager’s perspective, to the option of
investing in A—and deriving benefit one way or the other from all 100 of the investment
income.
If S is sensitive to domestic tax but less so than P, the FTC method still does not
equalize the attractions of the domestic and foreign investments. Both investments would
leave S with 75 of retained earnings. Whereas S’ manager might be able to derive benefit
from 25 of domestic tax paid on the domestic investment, he can derive benefit only from
5 of domestic tax paid on the foreign investment.
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